Breaking the Mortgage Gridlock

The U.S. housing market is not slow. It is frozen. Inventory is stuck, rates are elevated, and prices have not corrected. Sellers refuse to give up their two to three percent mortgages, and buyers have nothing to purchase. This is the largest mortgage lock-in event in modern history, and until the structure changes, nothing improves.

Below are the mortgage-specific ideas that matter in this conversation: portable mortgages, assumable mortgages, and the proposed fifty-year mortgage, which is a dangerous policy that should never be implemented.

The Lock-In Crisis

More than eleven trillion dollars in mortgages carry interest rates below three percent. This creates a nationwide freeze. No homeowner will trade a 2.7 percent mortgage for a 6.7 percent mortgage. No family will double their payment to move laterally. No retiree will leave a cheap loan to downsize into a more expensive one. People are not staying put because they want to. They are trapped by the math.

Portable Mortgages

A portable mortgage allows a homeowner to take their existing mortgage and attach it to a new property. The rate stays the same. The balance stays the same. The mortgage simply moves. This is the most direct solution to the lock-in crisis because it restores mobility without forcing homeowners into today’s higher interest rates.

Portability is extremely complicated inside the U.S. mortgage system.

A. Mortgages are underwritten to a specific property

Every mortgage is approved based on the collateral of one property. The appraisal, the condition, the geographic risk, and the market volatility are all baked into the original underwriting. When a mortgage moves to a new property, none of those assumptions remain valid. Lenders would have to perform a full re-underwrite on the borrower and the new collateral. This is not a minor update. It is essentially a brand-new loan approval process.

B. The original loan balance is tied to the original property

A mortgage’s principal balance is linked to the loan-to-value ratio of a specific home. Moving a three-hundred-thousand-dollar balance to a new property instantly creates mismatched loan-to-value conditions. If the new home is worth more, less, or has different risk factors, the loan may no longer meet investor or agency guidelines. This breaks the rules under which the loan was originally sold.

C. Portability disrupts servicing operations

Servicers handle escrow, insurance, taxes, reporting, and payment management. Their systems were built on the assumption that a single mortgage remains tied to a single property. Moving a mortgage changes insurance requirements, tax obligations, and escrow calculations. Many servicing platforms cannot modify these items without creating compliance issues. This introduces operational risk.

D. Portability breaks securitization

This is the largest barrier. Most mortgages are sold into mortgage-backed securities. Investors buy pools of loans with the expectation that collateral, amortization, and risk profiles remain fixed. If a loan moves to a different property, the collateral is no longer fixed. This violates the security’s structure. If even one loan in a pool becomes non-conforming, the entire pool can be flagged as defective. Investors may refuse to buy these securities unless the entire system is redesigned. This is why portability requires changes from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHA, the VA, private investors, and servicers. One stakeholder saying no is enough to kill the idea.

E. Every participant in the system must agree

Portable mortgages touch every part of the mortgage ecosystem. Underwriting, servicing, compliance, securitization, government agencies, and private investors must all sign off. None have signaled approval. This is the core reason portable mortgages do not exist in the United States.

Despite the complexity, portable mortgages are the most consumer-friendly idea being discussed, and they are the only structural tool that truly solves the lock-in problem.

Assumable Mortgages

An assumable mortgage allows a buyer to take over the seller’s existing loan and keep the seller’s low interest rate. FHA and VA loans allow assumptions with strict rules. Conventional loans rarely allow them. In theory, assumables offer buyers relief in a high-rate environment. In practice, they are difficult to expand for many of the same reasons portability is difficult.

A. New borrowers must qualify under old guidelines

When a buyer assumes a mortgage, the lender must confirm the buyer meets the underwriting standards that applied when the original loan was issued. Guidelines change frequently. A borrower who qualifies under today’s rules may not qualify under the rules from five or ten years ago. This makes widespread assumability operationally complicated.

B. The original borrower may remain liable

Unless there is a formal release of liability, the seller may remain legally responsible for the mortgage even after the buyer assumes it. Not all loans allow full release. This creates legal risk for sellers and for lenders.

C. Servicers lose future revenue

If low-rate loans become assumable on a large scale, servicers lose refinance opportunities. When the market eventually shifts and rates drop, those loans would not refinance. Servicers rely heavily on refinance income. Large-scale assumability could disrupt their business model.

D. Assumability disrupts securitization

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pools are priced with the expectation that loans will prepay or refinance on predictable timelines. Assumable mortgages slow prepayment speeds dramatically. That changes the expected yield for investors. To compensate, investors would demand higher interest rates on new mortgages nationwide. Assumability at scale could increase mortgage rates across the entire market.

E. The equity gap

When a buyer assumes a mortgage, they take over the existing loan balance, which is typically far lower than the current home value. The buyer must bring significant cash to closing or secure a second loan for the difference. This makes assumables less accessible for most buyers. In addition, the secondary financing introduces new underwriting and risk layers.

Assumables help buyers. They do not solve mobility for sellers. They do not resolve the lock-in crisis. They are a partial solution, not a structural fix.

The Fifty-Year Mortgage

The proposed fifty-year mortgage is being presented as an affordability tool. It is not. It is an extended debt trap that benefits banks and gives politicians a headline without solving anything.

A thirty-year mortgage at six percent on a three-hundred-thousand-dollar loan costs $1,799 per month. A fifty-year mortgage at seven percent costs $1,805 per month. It is more expensive per month and lasts twenty additional years. Even if the government forces lenders to offer the same six percent rate, the monthly savings are modest and the long-term cost is enormous. Borrowers would pay roughly three hundred thousand dollars more in interest. This is not affordability. This is a long-term erosion of consumer wealth.

The Real Issue: Housing Supply

Every major housing and economic research institution agrees that the United States is short between 1.5 million and 7.1 million homes. Restrictive zoning, density limits, slow permitting, and local opposition to new development have created a structural shortage. Mortgage policy alone cannot fix a supply shortage. Until more homes are built, affordability problems persist.

What Works

Portable mortgages offer the cleanest and most direct path to restoring mobility and unfreezing inventory. Assumable mortgages offer selective relief for buyers but do not help sellers move affordably. The fifty-year mortgage is harmful and counterproductive.

The future of housing depends on whether policymakers choose to rebuild the system around consumer mobility or maintain the current structure that favors lenders and investors. If the goal is true mobility, more inventory, and improved affordability, portable mortgages provide the most effective path forward.